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Abstract  
This aim of this study was to analyse the influence of governance quality on development in Southern Africa 
using a set of cross country panel data from 11 countries during 2005 to 2012. Based on the Breusch-Pagan 
Lagrangian Multiplier test and Hausman test procedures, a Random Effects model, the results show that political 
stability; and voice and accountability exhibit significant positive effects on development; with political stability 
indicating a more pronounced significant impact on development in the region. The estimated R-squared shows 
that nearly 25.97 percent total variation in development was accounted for by political stability and voice and 
accountability. The Wald chi-square (=29.75; p < 0.05) shows significance of the model.  
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1. Introduction  
With the continued presence of malfunctioning governments across the globe remaining a widespread turmoil, 
lack of good governance has caused detrimental effects on the welfare and development of humans (Adsera, 
Boix & Payne, 2000). According to Akpan & Effiong (2012), good governance is an important instrument for 
poverty eradication. Virtually, improved governance systems strongly enhance the quality of human life through 
poverty eradication, reliable and affordable health care and access to sound education. Generally, governance 
comprises of institutional mechanisms through which political and administrative authority is exercised in 
managing the country’s economic, social and political affairs; thus determining the processes through which 
citizens exercise their rights.  
The World Bank (2013) regards governance as a process that consists of traditions and institutions by 
which authority in a country is exercised with regards to the process by which governments are selected, 
monitored and replaced; the capacity of the government to effectively formulate and implement sound policies; 
and the respect of citizens and the state for the institutions that govern economic and social interactions among 
them. Previous studies that have examined the effect of governance on development include Mauro (1995), Hall 
& Jones (1997), Knack & Keefer (1995), Kaufman, Kraay & Zoido-Lobaton (1999a), Rodrik, Subramanian & 
Trebbia (2004), Meon & Weill (2005), Acemoglu & Johnson (2005), Barro (2007), Akpan & Effiong (2012) and 
Baek & Oh (2013).  
The objective of this study was to analyse the impact of governance on development in Southern 
African region. The paper is organised as follows: Section 2 reviews literature on governance and development. 
Section 3 specifies the methodology and estimation procedure; while Section 4 presents and discusses the 
findings. Section 5 provides conclusion and recommendations.  
 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The concept of governance dominates the center stage in the realm of public policy debates on development 
(Vadlamannati, 2008). Following Adsera, Boix & Payne (2000), although substantial constitutional mechanisms 
have been adopted to make public officials accountable to citizens, the sustained existence of malfunctioning 
governing institutions has generated detrimental socioeconomic effects on the welfare of citizens. From a 
governance perspective, the ways in which governance and administration are practiced in a country directly 
translate into the quality of human lives. Mauro (1995), Easterly & Levine (1997) and Kaufman, Kraay & Zoido-
Lobaton (1999b) indicate that countries within which governments can be held accountable for their actions 
provide evidence that good governance is an effective instrument for enhancing human welfare. Borrowing from 
Barro (2007), Tridico (2007) highlights that improved human life generates a better skilled and productive 
labour force that further enhances economic growth.    
Following Kaufmann, Kraay & Mastruzzi (2010), the quality of governance is best measured based on 
six indicators; namely Political Stability, Voice and Accountability, Government Effectiveness, Regulatory 
Quality, Rule of Law and Control of Corruption. The ranking of these indicators follows a normal distribution of 
scores ranging between -2.5 to +2.5; with high scores reflecting better quality of governance and vice versa. 
Succeeding Kaufmann et al (1999a), the first dimension of governance comprises of two indicators; namely 
political stability; and voice and accountability. In broad terms, the respective two indicators measure the 
processes through which governments are selected, monitored and replaced. Individually, the political stability 
and absence of violence measures the perceived likelihood of destabilizing the government through 
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unconstitutional violent actions; while voice and accountability estimates the extent to which a country’s citizens 
participate in the selection of government, exercise freedom of expression, association and press. Findings from 
the study by Tridico (2007) indicate that voice and accountability has a substantial effect on development; while 
political stability remains insignificant. From an economic development perspective based on income per capita, 
Akpan & Effiong (2012) find political stability as having a significant and positive effect on development sub-
Saharan Africa. As such, it can be inferred that political stability and absence of violence are necessary 
conditions for stimulating economic development.  
Proceeding further, the second dimension of governance captures government effectiveness; and 
regulatory quality. This dimension measures the capacity of government to effectively formulate and implement 
sound policies. Discretely, government effectiveness reflects the quality of public services, the quality of civil 
service and the degree of government independence from political pressures; as well as credibility of 
government’s commitment. Regulatory quality reflects the perceptions of the ability of the government to 
formulate and implement sound policies and regulations that are conducive to private sector development. While 
Tridico (2007) finds regulatory quality as having no significant impact on development, government 
effectiveness, however demonstrates a statistically significant positive effect on development; indicating an 
efficient provision of social infrastructure public goods and services such as road networks, safe and clean water, 
energy and power supply, education and health facilities. Using the per capita income as a development indicator, 
Akpan & Effiong (2012) find that regulatory quality has a significant positive impact on development; signifying 
that the adoption of non-distortionary policies stimulate business confidence; market efficiency and development.  
The last dimension of governance comprises of two indicators; namely the rule of law and control of 
corruption. These indicators collectively measure the respect for citizens and state of the institutions that govern 
citizens’ economic and social interactions. While the rule of law reflects the extent to which agents have 
confidence in and abide by the rules of the society, the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the 
police, the courts as well as the possibility of crime and violence; control of corruption measures the extent to 
which public power is exercised for private gain, including petty and grand corruption, as well as the state by 
elites and private interests. Based on the empirical findings by Tridico (2007) on emerging economies, both the 
rule of law and the regulatory quality have no significant effects on development. The results suggest that the 
respective two indicators of governance were perceived to be weak to the extent that they are not significant 
enough to enhance development. Measuring development based on the income per capita, Akpan & Effiong 
(2012) find control of corruption as having no significant positive effect on development; while the rule of law 
demonstrates a statistically significant and positive impact on development. From a governance perspective, 
these results signify that respecting and abiding by the rule of law is an effective instrument towards achieving 
economic development. Based on the recent literature, efforts to enhance development through improvement of 
governance quality should observe all the governance indicators as complements to each other rather than as 
substitutes (Campos & Nugent, 1999).   
 
3. ECONOMETRIC METHODOLOGY 
3.1 Data 
The study uses cross-country panel data on development and governance indicators for a set of 11 countries in 
Southern Africa during the period 2005-2012. Data on countries’ development indices was collected from the 
UNDP’s Development Report 2013 online database. Similarly, the data on political stability; voice and 
accountability; government effectiveness, regulatory quality; rule of law and control of corruption was obtained 
from the World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators 2013 online database.  
The development index was used as the ideal proxy for development; while the six governance 
indicators were used as determinants of development. While the development index measures the average 
achievement in three basic dimensions of development; namely a long and healthy life, knowledge and decent 
standard of living; governance indicators measure perceived quality of governance based on views of large 
numbers of survey respondents and expert assessments worldwide. 
 
3.2 Estimation Procedure  
The econometric procedure followed in selecting the appropriate estimation model was based on appraisal of 
three panel data models; namely Pooled OLS regression, GLS Random Effects (RE) and Fixed Effects (FE) 
models. The Breusch-Pagan Lagrangian Multiplier and Hausman test techniques were used to select the suitable 
models.    
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The Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian Multiplier test was run on the RE model to appropriately choose between the 
Pooled OLS and RE model. The respective LM test was run based on the formulation: 
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Following rejection of the hypothesis that the Pooled OLS regression was appropriate (Table 2), the Hausman 
test was run to choose between the RE model and FE model based on the formulation: 
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The Hausman test results were used to select the appropriate model between RE and FE at 5% level of 
significance. Differences across panels were measured by the interclass correlation (ρ); which approaches 1 if 
the respective individual effects dominates the idiosyncratic error.  
 
3.3 Econometric Model 
The econometric estimation method used in the study was a single equation model formulated as: 
 
ituCntrlCorrRulLawgQualGvtEffVoiceAccPolStabHDI +++++++= )()()(Re)()()( 654321 ββββββα - 
(6) 
where: HDI symbolizes Development Index; PStab represents Political stability; VAcc denotes Voice and 
Accountability; GEff signifies Government Effectiveness; RQual symbolizes Regulatory Quality; RLaw 
represents Rule of law; and CCorr denotes Control of Corruption.  
     
4. Results and Discussion 
4.1 Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian Multiplier (LM) Test 
The Breusch and Pagan LM test was applied on the estimates of the RE model (Table 1) to evaluate whether the 
Pooled OLS regression was appropriate model to apply for analysis.  
 
Table 1: GLS Random Effects 
R-squared: within     = 0.2594 
                   between = 0.2597 
                   overall   = 0.2597 
 
corr(u_i,x)              = 0 (assumed)  
             obs per group              : min  = 8 
                                                 : avg  = 8.0 
                                                 : max = 8 
             Wald chi2(2)                   = 29.75 
              Prob > chi2                     = 0.0000 
Development Coeff. Std. Err.   z P > | z | 95% Conf. Interval 
Political Stability 
Voice and Accountability 
_cons 
.0432169 
.0513120 
.4824625 
.0098269 
.0223143 
.0316755 
4.40 
2.30 
15.23 
0.000 
0.021 
0.000 
.0239566 
.0075767 
.4203796 
.0624772 
.0950473 
.5445454 
sigma_u 
sigma_e 
rho 
.10355371 
.01607852 
.9764593  
 
 
(fraction of variance due to u_i) 
The Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian Multiplier test for random effects results (Table 2) rejected the null 
hypothesis that the Pooled OLS regression was appropriate. All the other governance indicators were dropped 
out of the model as they remained statistically insignificant in influencing development.  
 
Table 2: Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian Multiplier test for Random Effects results 
HDI [Country, t] = Xb + u [Country] + e [Country, t] 
                                                                   Var                                                    sd = sqrt(Var) 
Development  
e 
u 
.0109957 
.0002585 
.0107233 
.1048606 
.0160785 
.1035532 
Test: Var (u) = 0                            Chibar2(01) = 288.97                         Prob > chibar2 = 0.0000  
   
The FE model was further run (Table 3) to make appropriately selection between the RE and FE models based 
on the Hausman test results.  
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Table 3: Fixed Effects results 
R-squared: within     = 0.2594 
                   between = 0.2596 
                   overall   = 0.2595 
 
corr(u_i, Xb)            = -0.0574  
                                           obs per group: min = 8 
                                                                   : avg = 8.0 
                                                                 : max = 8 
                                           F (2, 75)           = 13.14 
                                             Prob > F           = 0.0000 
Development  Coeff. Std. Err.    t P> |t| 95% Conf. Interval 
Political Stability 
Voice and Accountability 
 _cons 
.0432599 
.0532143 
.4830355 
.010011 
.025577 
.008083 
4.32 
2.08 
59.75 
0.000 
0.041 
0.000 
.0233160 
.0022608 
.4669319 
.0632037 
.1041678 
.4991390 
sigma_u 
sigma_e 
rho 
.0929549 
.0160785 
.9709501 
 
 
 
F test that all u_i = 0:                                F (10, 75) = 266.29                             Prob > F = 0.0000 
  
The Hausman test (Table 4) was run to select the appropriate model between RE and FE models.  
 
Table 4: Hausman test results 
       Coefficients 
(b) 
FE1 
(B) 
RE1 
(b-B) 
Difference 
sqrt(diag(V_b–V_B) 
Political Stability  
Voice and Accountability  
.0432599 
.0532143 
.0432169 
.0513120 
.0000430 
.0019023 
.0011551 
.0118786 
Test Ho: difference in coefficients not systematic: 
chi2(2) = 0.03 Prob > chi2 = 0.9867 
   
The Hausman test was run to determine whether the individual effects are random. Given the null 
hypothesis that both the FE and RE models are consistent, and the alternative hypothesis that the RE is not 
consistent, results from the Hausman test performed implied non-rejection of the null hypothesis that the RE 
model was appropriate. The coefficient estimates of the RE model were therefore consistent.   
Based on the RE model results; both political stability; and voice and accountability demonstrated 
substantial positive effects on development in the Southern African region. In comparative terms, political 
stability had a more remarkable positive impact on development than voice and accountability. Results reveal 
that 1 percent improvement in political stability leads to approximately 4.32 percent improvement in 
development in respect of healthy life, knowledge acquisition and decent standard of living. Correspondingly, a 
1 percent improvement in the quality of voice and accountability leads to nearly 5.13 percent improvement in the 
quality of citizens’ health care, knowledge and standard of living. Overall, the R-squared statistic of the random 
effect model indicates that approximately 25.97 percent total variation in development in the respective region 
was accounted for by political stability; and voice and accountability during the period under review. 
Furthermore, the Wald chi2 (=29.75; p < 0.05) revealed significance of the estimated model; while the interclass 
correlation revealed that approximately 97.65 percent of the variance computed from the model was due to 
differences across panels.    
 
5. Conclusion and Recommendations 
5.1 Conclusion 
This paper estimated the individual impacts of distinct governance indicators on development in Southern 
African region during the period 2005–2012. From the six world governance indicators, government 
effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law and control of corruption remained statistically insignificant 
towards influencing development. Only political stability; and voice and accountability demonstrated substantial 
positive impacts on development in the region. From the development perspective, the results yielded by 
political stability; and voice and accountability indicators provide evidence that improvements in processes 
through which governments are selected, monitored and replaced undoubtedly enhances the quality of human 
life. Although the direction of causality remains unclear, the notion by Campos & Nugent (1999) that the 
dimensions of governance are complimentary in nature conforms to the findings of this study. It can therefore be 
inferred that improvement in voice and accountability positively translates into political stability; while the 
presence of political stability provides an environment conducive for citizens to live with dignity, exercise their 
rights of freedom of expression; and hold the government responsible for formulation and implementation of 
policies that are responsive to people’s socioeconomic needs and aspirations.  
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5.2 Recommendations  
The strive to achieve development at country, regional and global levels requires commitment by parties vested 
with constitutional authority to creating conditions that citizens can develop a sense of self-worth, security and 
dignity. Given the conformity of the current results to development literature that governance quality plays an 
essential role in stimulating development, governments in the region need to observe that improvement in 
governance quality remains an effective instrument for achieving regional integration across social, political and 
economic dimensions. Governance reforms also need to be made at both regional and country levels; especially 
towards promoting legitimate inclusive participation in finding solutions development challenges. Given that the 
overall goodness of the model was not high, future research on the subject of governance and development nexus 
should integrate a large number of countries over a longer sample period in order to yield better results.    
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